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ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War has left the United States as the world's sole
superpower. The ability of the United States to strike deep into the territories of most
nations with impunity represents a new security threat to many nations. Defeating the
U.S. military is not feasible in most cases, but balancing the United States may be
possible, especially with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although WMD might
provide a formidable deterrent, their technical, political, and economic costs preclude
most nations from pursuing them. On the other hand, modern conventionally-powered
submarines are easier to obtain and operate and could present a significant deterrent to
U.S. military force. This thesis assesses whether the perceived threat posed by the
United States has emerged as a motivation for acquiring conventionally-powered
submarines since the end of the Cold War. After examining the motivations behind the
recent submarine acquisitions of India and Iran, this thesis presents an economic model to
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The increasing U.S. reliance on cruise missile diplomacy since the end of the Cold
War has left many nations with a perceived security threat posed by the United States.
This thesis assesses whether this perceived threat has emerged as a motivating factor
behind conventionally-powered submarine acquisition. After examining the supply and
demand-side factors behind conventional weapons transfers in general, this thesis
analyzes the recent submarine acquisitions of India and Iran to determine if balancing the
United States may have been a motivating factor.
Powerful supply-side factors currently make it a "buyers' market" for advanced
conventional arms. Whether the supplier state is motivated to maintain its technological
base, produce arms for economy of scale, or raise hard currency from foreign sources, it
must actively seek markets for its arms. Submarine suppliers make attractive deals
including the most advanced technology, training, support, and weapons to lure foreign
buyers.
Although supply-side factors play a role in all conventional weapons transfers,
historically, it has been the demand-side factors that drive countries to acquire
conventional arms. Prestige, political influence, technology, bureaucracy, and security
concerns are the demand-side factors assessed in this thesis. While each of these may
play a role to varying degrees, security concerns appear to be the primary driver.
Although documented evidence of motivations for any weapons acquisition simply does
ix
not exist, motivations are inferred by examining details of the deal and the proposed
methods of employment.
In January 1997, the Indian Defense Ministry concluded a deal with Russia to
purchase two Project-636 Kilo submarines for approximately $430 million. It has also
been reported that the latest Indian defense budget will include funds to build two more
submarines to be in service by 2005. India produced two German Type-209s under
license at the Mazagon Dock Ltd., Bombay during the 1980s. Although Indian security
concerns over Pakistan's recent submarine acquisition from France are the primary drivers
behind India's submarine acquisition, evidence suggests that balancing the U.S. naval
presence in the region also might have played a small role.
Also in January 1997, Iran took delivery of its third Kilo class conventionally-
powered submarine from Russia. The $600 million per hull deal included training,
technical support, and weapons (including wake-homing heavy-weight torpedoes). This
submarine capability will significantly enhance Iran's already considerable layered littoral
warfare capabilities. Iran's acquisition of these submarines presents the best case of a
regional power attempting to balance the overwhelming superiority of the United States.
After establishing the possibility that balancing the United States may be a motive
for submarine acquisition, this thesis lays the foundation for building a predictive model
of when emerging countries will be able to afford submarines because supply and demand-
side factors are not the only issues involved. Using economic variables and statistical
analysis, this thesis presents a preliminary model for predicting when countries can afford
submarines. Although economic constraints can be overcome when a nation is highly
motivated to acquire expensive conventional weapons to counter perceived security
threats, economic considerations can play a role in the decision making process. The
model presented here requires refinement, however, it may prove useful for planning
purposes to forecast when potential adversaries could acquire conventionally-powered
submarines.
The findings of this thesis indicate that balancing the United States has emerged as
a motivating factor in the acquisition of conventionally-powered submarine since the end
of the Cold War. Also, the current "buyers' market" coupled with the growing economies
of emerging nations suggests that more nations will be able to afford conventionally-
powered submarines in the near future. The implications of these findings are that
conventionally-powered submarines will continue to proliferate, as well as the number of
countries operating them. U.S. policy makers must take into consideration the
perceptions of nations with the potential to acquire submarines and weigh carefully the
inherent costs associated with conducting cruise missile diplomacy against a nation
possessing conventionally-powered submarines. And finally, the U.S. Navy must
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The end of the Cold War has left the United States as the dominant military
power in the world. Coupled with the global nature of U.S. national security interests,
this unprecedented military superiority places the United States at odds with many
nations with regional aspirations. The GulfWar and subsequent unilateral U.S. cruise
missile attacks against Iraq has left many nations with a perceived security threat posed
by the United States. According to balance-of-power theory, states will seek to balance
threats posed by other states. In seeking to preserve their autonomy in the anarchic
context of international relations, states will respond to the perceived threats posed by
other states. 1 "States must constantly be ready to counter force with force or pay the
cost of weakness."2 So how do nations attempt balance the overwhelming conventional
military force of the United States?
It must be understood at the outset that efforts to balance do not imply attempts
to achieve equality. Balancing the threat posed by the United States does not require
becoming a peer competitor or defeating the United States directly. Rather, regional
powers can balance the overwhelming conventional military forces of the United States to
a degree by increasing the risks and costs involved with U.S. intervention in a region. It is
1
Barry R. Posen, The Sources ofMilitary Doctrine (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984),
17.
2
Kenneth N Waltz, "The Third Image: International Conflict and International Anarchy," Man, The State
and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 160.
1
a given that the United States will remain engaged in a region as long as its national
security objectives are at stake; however, by increasing the risks involved, a regional
power could deter U.S. intervention in pursuit of lesser objectives. Thus the regional
actor could have more latitude to pursue its objectives.
Since the end of the GulfWar, the United States has resorted to cruise missile
strikes in pursuit of its national interests on four separate occasions. Whether employed
for deterrence,
3
compellance,4 or reprisal, 5 Tomahawk cruise missiles have become the
weapon of choice for the U.S. National Command Authority. In fact, the use of cruise
missiles has become the latest version of U.S. gunboat diplomacy.6 Not only can they be
employed without the fear of losing pilots, but steaming in international waters, U.S.
warships, both surfaced and submerged, can lob cruise missiles deep within most nations'
territories with near impunity. See Figure 1 for worldwide Tomahawk cruise missile
coverage. This is the conventional military capability against which many other nations
are likely to seek to balance.
3
Iraq, September 1996, U.S. use of cruise missiles to deter Saddam Hussein from advancing in the south.
4
Bosnia. Summer 1995, U.S. use of cruise missiles to compel factions to the negotiating table.
5
Iraq. January 1993, U.S. use of cruise missiles to destroy the nuclear weapons factory, and Iraq, June
1993. U.S. use of cruise missiles to destroy an intelligence building in response to the plotted
assassination of former President Bush.
6
For a detailed analysis of Tomahawk cruise missile employment since the Gulf War, see Timothy F.
Sparks. "The Dawn of Cruise Missile Diplomacy," (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 1997).
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Figure 1. Worldwide Tomahawk Coverage
Courtesy ofU.S. Navy Program Executive Office: Cruise Missiles and UAVs
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) certainly provide a balancing option.
Possession ofWMD by foreign states (and even non-state actors) can weigh heavily on
the calculus U.S. decision makers use to determine if the United States should be involved
in a region; however, the immense technical, economic, and political costs ofWMD have
precluded most states from pursuing them. 7 Additionally, Iraqi attempts to develop
WMD have been met with U.S. cruise missile attacks. Could this be a harbinger of future
U.S. response to WMD development by other nations? Furthermore, simply possessing
7
For a detailed analysis of the technical and economic costs ofWMD development see Office of
Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
WMD may not be enough to deter U.S. cruise missile attacks since, with the exception of
nuclear weapons, WMD are virtually ineffective against U.S. naval vessels. 8 State-
sponsored terrorism could provide another balancing option, but here again the political
costs would be enormous. 9
If countries are unable to balance the United States with WMD or state-sponsored
terrorism, how can they preserve their autonomy in the face of overwhelming U.S.
conventional forces? It may be possible for nations to balance U.S. conventional military
force by incorporating the latest technology in a thousand-year-old concept ~ the modern
conventionally-powered submarine.
This thesis examines the supply and demand-side factors behind the acquisition of
modern conventionally-powered submarines and assesses whether U.S. military strategies
since the end of the Cold War have actually motivated some nations to acquire them. The
recent submarine acquisitions of India and Iran are presented as case studies. Using
statistical analysis, this thesis then assesses the feasibility of using economic indicators to
predict when a nation will be able to afford acquiring submarines. And finally, this thesis
explores the implications the proliferation of modern conventionally-powered submarines
have for future U.S. foreign policy and makes recommendations on how the United States
can minimize their impact.
Not only are the means to deliver and disperse chemical and biological weapons inadequate to completely
disable naval vessels at sea, U.S. naval vessels are equipped and trained in mission oriented protective
postures (MOPP) that allow the ship to continue its mission while under chemical or biological attack.
9
If accountability of a terrorist act could be traced back to a particular state. U.S. retaliation would most
likely be massive.
The remainder of this chapter introduces modern submarine warfare by tracing its
development from the Second World War to the Falklands War and then assesses the
significance of current submarine capabilities. The following two chapters discuss the
supply-side and demand-side factors behind arms transfers more generally; chapters four
and five are the case studies on India and Iran respectively. The economic analysis and
forecast portion of this study are presented in chapter six. The concluding chapter
summarizes the main findings of the study, their implications, and presents policy
recommendations.
THE SUBMARINE AS A BALANCE TO U.S. STRATEGY
Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility ofvictory in the attack.
One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.
Sun Tzu10
The modern conventionally-powered submarine can offer many states a potent
alternative to developing WMD to raise the potential costs of U.S. involvement in the
region. The conventionally-powered submarines currently on the market are
sophisticated and have the potential to challenge and significantly complicate U.S.
military options. These submarines can remain undetected in the relatively restricted
waters of littoral regions. Equipped with modern anti-ship torpedoes and mines, even
one or two submarines can have significant destructive power. Upgraded with high-
10
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 85.
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technology quieting, sensors, weapons, and propulsion systems, these submarines have
the potential to hold enemy naval forces at risk while posing a difficult challenge for anti-
submarine forces. Coupled with the recent U.S. de-emphasis in anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) as a result of the end ofthe Cold War, 11 conventionally-powered submarines can
present a significant deterrent to regional intervention by U.S. naval forces.
1. Historical Precedence
The concept of submarine warfare is almost as old as naval warfare itself;
however, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the submarine came
into its own as a weapon of war. By the Second World War, the submarine was an
instrument of global power. 12 Although the submarine was initially employed as an
instrument of attrition warfare, it has proven to be an effective coastal defense platform.
The following historical accounts are not intended to be authoritative or all inclusive;
however, they are intended to illustrate the tremendous impact a relatively small number
of submarines can have and the massive ASW effort required to counter them.
11 Thomas A. Brooks, Rear Admiral. U.S. Navy (Ret.), "Whatever Happened to ASW?" U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 122 no. 2 (February 1996). 13.
12
For an excellent survey of the evolution of submarine technology, submarine capability, and strategies in
submarine warfare see Karl Lautenschlager. "The Submarine in Naval Warfare," International Security 1
1
no. 3 (Winter 1986-87): 94-140.
a. Germany During World War II
Between 1935 and 1945, the German navy commissioned a total of 1,171
submarines. During the war 940 German U-boats sortied and were responsible for the
sinking of over 2,800 Allied merchant ships, accounting for 68 percent of all tonnage.
Between January and July 1942, 14 German U-boats sank over 450 Allied ships. The
Allied ASW response was tremendous. For each operational U-boat, the United States
and Britain responded with 25 warships and over 100 aircraft. In the end, over 6 million
men, 5,500 specially constructed ships and 20,000 small craft were required to counter
the German U-boat threat. 13 This tremendous dedication of men and material ultimately
resulted in the destruction of 593 of the 784 German U-boats lost during the war. 14
b. United States During World War II
In the Pacific Campaign against Imperial Japan during the Second World
War, the United States sortied 249 submarines against Japan. The U.S. Submarine Force
is credited with the destruction of 1,178 Japanese merchant vessels (5,053,491 tons) and
214 Japanese Naval vessels accounting for 55 percent of all Japanese shipping sunk
during the war in the Pacific. 15 The Japanese ASW effort was not nearly as effective as
13
Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1994), 32.
14
Karl Lautenschlager, "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001," 122.
15
Theodore Roscoe, U.S. Submarine Operations in WWII (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
1949): 491-494.
that of the Allies against Germany; however, it too required a disproportionate allocation
of resources and is credited with 31 of the 48 U.S. submarines lost during the war. 16
c Indo-Pakistani War, 1971
During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, three of the four Pakistani submarines
(an ex-US. Tench class submarine renamed Ghazi and two ofthe three modern Daphne
class) were involved in combat operations. At the outbreak of hostilities, Pakistan had
been operating submarines for less than ten years and had only been operating the
Daphnes for one year, yet the best ASW efforts of the Indian Navy were unable to defeat
the Pakistani Daphne-class submarines. In fact, no modern diesel submarine has ever
been destroyed by ASW forces. 17
The Ghazi and one of the Daphne submarines conducted operations in the
Bay of Bengal during the first two days ofthe conflict, 2,000-3,000 nautical miles from
their Karachi operating base. The Ghazi, while attempting to mine a harbor off
Vishakhapatam apparently struck one of its own mines and sunk, but the Daphne, after
conducting a refueling operation south of Sri Lanka, attacked the Indian aircraft carrier
Vikrant just south of Cox's Bazar, 3,000 nautical miles from Karachi. Although the
Daphne 's attack was unsuccessful, so was the Indian ASW counter attack. One week
16
Karl Lautenschlager, "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001," 122.
17
John R Benedict, "Future Perspectives in Antisubmarine Warfare." APL Technical Review 3, no. 2
(1992),161.
later, Pakistan's other Daphne, operating in the Arabian Sea south of Diu, attacked and
sunk an Indian ASW frigate that was investigating a reported submarine sighting.
d Falklands War, 1982
During the Falklands War, although the Argentinean Type-209 submarine
San Luis was unsuccessful in its attacks on British warships, it did elude the best ASW
efforts of the British Navy. The Argentinean submarine had an inexperienced and poorly
trained crew. Nevertheless, it spent almost seven weeks at sea, operated up to 800
nautical miles from its operating base, conducted two attacks on British warships, and
survived the conflict. Failure ofboth single-shot torpedo attacks conducted by the San
Luis was attributed to maintenance problems (fire control computer casualties) and
training deficiencies (torpedo control wires were broken prematurely).
The massive British ASW effort against this single conventionally-
powered submarine was unsuccessful. Numerous British assets were dedicated to the
effort including two ASW aircraft carriers and over a dozen frigates and destroyers.
During the course of the conflict, the British expended over 200 items ofASW ordnance
against this one submarine and what was described as a "sea full of false targets." 18
Traditionally, the submarine has been the preferred ASW weapon;
however, it is extremely difficult to coordinate surface and submarine ASW efforts. The
Benedict, "Future Perspectives in Antisubmarine Warfare," 160.
required communications between the involved surface ships and submarines and the
identification of friendly submarines significantly impedes the detection, classification,
and identification of enemy submarines. The British submarines that were deployed to
the theater during the Falklands War were not integrated into a coordinated ASW effort.
In fact, these submarines were specifically kept out of the area to eliminate the possibility
of fratricide and allow for an "ASW weapons free" zone for surface and air assets to
prosecute the enemy submarine. 19
2. Current Assessment
Currently, thirty-three non-NATO nations operate conventionally-powered
submarine forces. Seven countries are designing and building submarines for export, three
design and build submarines, but do not currently export, and seven countries build
submarines for their own use. Table 1 provides a list of submarine producers broken
down in the above categories and Appendix A provides a listing of worldwide inventories
of conventionally-powered submarines grouped by region.
The worldwide total of operational submarines, both nuclear and conventionally-
powered, is not likely to increase significantly in the coming decades. However, as both
the United States and Russia continue reduce their inventories of nuclear submarines, the
number of conventionally-powered submarines operated by other countries will increase
19
John R. Benedict, "Third World Submarine Developments," Submarine Review (October 1990), 54.
10
to maintain the overall number. 20 Additionally, as submarine technology becomes more
advanced and more affordable, obsolete conventionally-powered submarines will be
replaced with modem ones.
Table 1. Conventionally-Powered Submarine Producers
Builds Designs and Designs, Builds
Builds and Exports
Countries Argentina Italy China
Australia Japan France





The "buyers' market" with respect to conventionally-powered submarines,
coupled with the motivation to acquire submarines and the increasing ability of emerging
nations to afford them, suggest not only that the number of conventionally-powered
submarines will increase, but so will the number of countries operating them.
3. Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
Post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy and military strategies are important new
factors in the proliferation of submarines. The acquisition of submarines by states has
20
John R. Benedict, "Undersea Weapons - Technology Transfer with Anti-ship Implications" (brief
prepared for CIA/OTE, May 1996 update), 19.
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traditionally been influenced by regional security issues, prestige, and political
motivations. While these may still be valid motivations for acquiring submarines,
balancing U.S. regional influence has emerged as a new motivation in the aftermath of the
Cold War.
A conventionally-powered submarine force of even one or two platforms offers a
deterrent without the immense political and economic costs ofWMD. A few properly
operated submarines might not only be able deter the United States, but could possibly
even defeat U.S. military strategy and effect U.S. disengagement from the region. U.S.
forward deployed naval forces are exposed. Submarines able to operate undetected in the
littoral regions occupied by U.S. naval forces would have the advantage. Not only are
submarines difficult to detect and identify, but restrictive peacetime rules of engagement
would most likely preclude U.S. forces from preemptively eliminating this hazard. By
default, the first shot would likely be left to the enemy submarine. This set of
circumstances could be a powerful deterrent to the United States which must justify the
costs of engagement in the region.
A nation facing cruise missile strikes from U.S. warships off its coast would be
justified in fighting back. Possessing one or two conventionally-powered submarines
could provide a means to do so A single hit with a modern torpedo fired from a
conventionally-powered submarine would most likely have a devastating effect. 21
31
During the Falklands War the 13,000-ton Argentine cruiser Belgrano sank in about one hour after being
struck by two British torpedoes of fifty-year-old design.
12
Inflicting this type of damage on U.S. naval forces has the possibility of causing
U.S. interests to be called into question. The domestic reaction on both sides is likely to
be intense. U.S. domestic opinion could just as easily rally behind the action or compel
U.S. leadership to withdraw forces from the area. Complicating the issue further would
be that U.S. naval forces would most likely swiftly dispose of the enemy submarine once
fired upon. On the other hand, the submarine would likely be that nation's most prized
warship. Rallying their domestic (and perhaps world) opinion behind the "martyrs"
defending their country would be easy.
Entering into a war of attrition with the United States would not be a likely
objective ofmost nations. However, a regional actor pursuing regional objectives could
benefit by deterring the United States from intervening in the region. Conventionally-
powered submarines could possibly provide a credible, limited deterrent against the
United States without the political costs associated with WMD.
The proliferation of conventionally-powered submarines requires U.S. policy
makers to be aware ofthe potential hazards and consequences associated with engaging an
unfriendly nation possessing submarines. In this light, using the GulfWar and the
subsequent cruise missile attacks against Iraq as guides for future planning is misleading.
Although the consequences of Iraq possessing submarine assets during the GulfWar
cannot be estimated, it can be assured that they would not have been trivial. If Iraq had
possessed one or two submarines at the beginning of the conflict, U.S. strategy would
most likely have been much different. If unable to destroy the submarines at the outset,
13
the United States would have had to divert assets to prosecute them, and possibly alter
major portions of its strategy. Remember that U.S. amphibious assault on Kuwait was
abandoned largely due to the possibility of mines, and the potential threat posed by
conventionally-powered submarines is much more significant than that of mines. 22 The
Iraqi submarines would not even have had to have been operational. If Iraq had been able
to tow a non-operational submarine out to sea and scuttle it without being detected by the
United States, this one "unaccounted for submarine" would have required the diversion of
significant resources possibly hampering the sealift supply lines.
In situations short of war, as in the unilateral cruise missile strikes against Iraq
subsequent to the Gulf War, hostile submarines complicate the situation even more.
Restrictive U.S. rules of engagement (ROE) might afford the hostile submarine the first
shot, and the ensuing devastation inflicted on U.S. assets may be more than domestic
opinion would tolerate. Being forced from a region in this manner would have a
significant impact on future U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, before engaging in such
scenarios, U.S. national interests must be clearly defined and shown to outweigh the
potential costs.
22
"Iran's Naval Forces: A Shadow across the Gulf?" Jane 's Navy International 102, no. 2(1 March
1997), 14.
14
4. Implications for U.S. ASW Capabilities
The proliferation of conventionally-powered submarines also requires the United
States to concentrate its ASW efforts to deal with this potential problem. Throughout
the Cold War, U.S. ASW efforts were focused on the Soviet nuclear submarine threat
centering on the ability to destroy the Soviet SSBN fleet while protecting U.S. SSBNs
from Soviet SSNs. The threat posed by conventionally-powered submarines was
relegated to a much lower priority. The logic behind this strategy was that if U.S. ASW
efforts could effectively deal with the Soviet nuclear submarine threat, they could deal
with the lessor threat posed by conventionally-powered submarines. And while little
attention was paid to conventionally-powered submarines in the 1980s, the latest U.S.
Navy ASW assessment concedes that passive detection of these submarines would have
been "significantly more challenging than against the quietest nuclear powered submarine
of the day." 23 The end ofthe Cold War requires a major paradigm shift in ASW efforts.
The notion advanced by John Keegan in The Price ofAdmiralty, that in war the
seas will "appear empty" and that advanced submarines will duel for supremacy, is no
longer applicable. 24 The end of the cold war eliminated the Soviet submarine threat and
the Russian submarine force that superseded it is significantly reduced. Shifting our peer
competitor to China, as Tom Clancy does in his latest novel SSN, 25 is equally as
23
Department of the Navy,ASWAssessment (U), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1996, 16 (SECRET document).
24
John Keegan, The Price ofAdmiralty (New York: Viking Penguin Press, 1988), 275.
25 Tom Clancy, SSN (New York: Berkley Books, 1996).
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unlikely. The open-ocean threat posed by nuclear submarines operated by a strong peer
competitor has all but completely vanished, and it is not likely to reemerge for decades.
In spite of this, the U.S. Navy continues to discount the threat to U.S. naval
forces posed by conventionally-powered submarines citing crew inexperience, lack of
training, lack of maintenance capabilities, and lack of skill. 26 This logic is extremely
dangerous. Current U.S. ASW capabilities cannot prevent conventionally-powered
submarines from operating undetected in the littorals. Forward deploying U.S. naval
forces in waters where hostile conventionally-powered submarines operate puts them at
risk. U.S. ASW efforts must concentrate on the threat posed by conventionally-powered
submarines operating in the littorals because as events since the end ofthe Cold War have
shown, this is the environment that U.S. naval forces are most likely to be employed.
B. CONCLUSION
The U.S. National Security Strategy of"Engagement and Enlargement" articulates
the vision of enhanced U.S. security, prosperity at home, and democracy abroad. 27 The
U.S. Military Strategy of "Flexible and Selective Engagement" and in particular the U.S.
Navy Strategy of "Forward...from the Sea," developed to meet our national security
objectives, depend heavily on forward presence to promote stability and thwart
26 Ed Smith, Capt. U.S. Navy, "They Can Buy It, But..." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 120, no. 3
(February 1994)45-48.
7
The White House, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.
U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996), ii.
16
aggression.
28 The diplomatic value of forward deployed warships has long been
recognized, and they have been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for over a century.
However, forward deployed warships are also instruments of coercive diplomacy.
U.S. cruise missile diplomacy employed since the end of the GulfWar has sent a
clear message to the rest of the world that the United States is not only capable, but
willing to use its forward deployed military forces unilaterally to influence the political
leadership of other nations. The proposed arsenal ship, having but one mission, "to
inflict overwhelming punishing damage" only accentuates the rest of the world's
perception of the U.S. ability to attack with impunity. 29 By acquiring conventionally-
powered submarines, nations may be attempting to balance U.S. regional presence.
28
Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1995), and Department of the Navy, Forward...From the Sea (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1995).
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II. CONVENTIONALLY-POWERED SUBMARINE SUPPLY
A. INTRODUCTION
Transfers of expensive advanced conventional weapons, such as submarines,
experience strong supply-side and demand-side pressures. The supplier state is
influenced by a number of supply-side factors such as political leverage, maintaining
technological bases, and economics. The recipient state is influenced by a number of
demand-side factors such as prestige, and security concerns. 30 This chapter examines the
supply-side factors contributing to the current "buyers' market" for conventionally-
powered submarines, and chapter three explores the demand-side factors. The
proliferation of conventionally-powered submarines is driven by the combination of
supply and demand-side factors present.
B. SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS
For the purposes of the following description, the supply-side factors are divided
into three broad categories: political leverage, technology, and economics. 31 These
categories may seem somewhat arbitrary because there are no definite dividing lines
30
For excellent analyses of conventional arms transfers see Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of
Military Production and Trade (Toronto: Cambridge University Press, 1992). and Edward J. Laurance,
The International Arms Trade (New York: Lexington Books, 1992).
31
Adapted from Christian Catrina, "Main Directions of research in the Arms Trade," AAPSSAnnals 535
(September 1994): 190-205.
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between them and there are elements of each present in all of them; however, these broad
categories can serve to illuminate some of the major differences between post-Cold War
Russian and Western supply-side motivations.
1. Political Leverage
Throughout the Cold War, arms sales and transfers were a major source of
political leverage. Arms transfers became an instrument ofthe greater ideological struggle
by bringing the recipient into the supplier's camp. Not only could the supply of arms
serve to build trust in the relationship, the supplier could often exert an intangible
influence over the recipient government. Transfers of conventional arms continue to be a
"legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy."32
Arms transfers can also serve to establish coalitions and ensure alliance
interoperability. During the Cold War, both Soviet and Western arms suppliers sought to
strengthen their respective coalitions in military terms through the supply of arms. It
was also imperative to ensure hardware interoperability among members of each alliance.
During the Cold War, the United States supplied many of its allies with wartime
surplus and older submarines as new ones were built and put into commission. This
practice continued for almost three decades until the U.S. submarine force was exclusively
nuclear powered. The recipients of these conventional submarines is quite long and
32
Lora Lumpe, "Clinton's Conventional Arms Export Policy: So Little Change." Arms Control Today 25
no. 4 (May 1995): 9-14.
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includes most of Latin America and some European countries. In fact, Turkey continues
to operate 7 Guppy class and 2 Tang class submarines.
The Soviet Union supplied the Eastern Europe and the Communist Bloc with
most of their conventionally-powered submarines; Romania, Poland, and China are prime
examples. 33 Although Russian arms transfers are no longer an instrument ofthe greater




The need to maintain a technological base from which to produce submarines is a
supply-side factor. A producer state may not need additional submarines in its own
arsenal; however, stopping production may limit the ability to produce them in the
future. Although conventionally-powered submarines do not require the same degree of
sophistication as nuclear submarines, the skills and technology are just as perishable.
The producer state must find a market to supply in order to maintain the
capability to produce submarines. Although the United States does not export
submarines, the requirement to maintain a technological base was quite evident in the
recent debate over funding the third Seawolf submarine. There have also been proposals
33
Appendix A gives the current worldwide inventories of conventionally-powered submarines grouped by
region.
34
Konstantin Sorokin. "Russia's 'New Look' Arms Sales Strategy," Arms Control Today 23 no. 8
(October 1993): 7-12.
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to build German Type-209 submarines under license for export to maintain U.S.
conventional ship-building base. 35
Western European submarine producers including France, Germany, and Sweden
are all seeking to maintain their technological base by producing submarines for export. 36
3. Economics
Producing and selling advanced military hardware has always been a good way to
raise hard currency. Arms producing companies in a capitalist system must sell to make a
profit. Economies of scale (reducing the manufacturing cost of an individual unit by
producing more units in order to recoup research and development expenditures) are a
good way to increase the profit margin. If they are not required in the arsenal of the
producer state, they are made for export.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy has been in
shambles. Besides selling their vast reserves of natural resources, selling surplus and
newly manufactured conventional arms is one of the only ways to raise hard currency. In
1996, Russia sold approximately $3.6 billion worth of military arms accounting for 17
35
"Building Conventional Subs in the United States," Naval Forces 15, no. 5 (1994): 20--24.
36
Lara Cantuti, "Pakistan Looks to Russia, France for Advanced Aircraft and Subs," Arms Control Today
24 no. 10 (December 1994), 22, "SUBCON '95," Naval Forces 16, no. 6 (1995): 34-39, and "Swedish'
Submarine Technology," Naval Forces 15, no. 3 (1994): 40-48.
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percent of the world total. 37 Although economic factors influence western producers as
well, the condition of the western economies lessen their magnitude. The state of the
Russian economy and the need to raise hard currency from abroad magnifies the economic
factors involved in their submarine export program. According to naval expert Norman
Polmar, "The Russians will sell anything to anybody to earn hard currency and keep
production lines going.". 38
C. CONVENTIONALLY-POWERED SUBMARINE EXPORTS
Currently, seven countries design, build, and export conventional submarines:
Germany, Russia, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, Netherlands, and China. Three
nations design and build but do not currently export submarines: United States, Japan,
and Italy. Seven countries build submarines under license for their own use: Australia,
Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, India, North Korea, and South Korea. Besides the German
Type-209, and the Russian Kilo, other submarines for export include France's Daphne-
class and more recently the Agosta-dass submarines, Sweden's T96, the British Oberon-
class, the Netherlands' Zwaardv/5-class, and China's former Soviet-based designs. These
submarines are extremely capable and are available on the open market; however, since
most of the deals for these submarines are still being negotiated, only the German Type-
' Youry A. Lambert, "High Technology and Defense Industry Sectors Opening up in Russia and
Ukraine." Information Access Company, Newsletter Database, World Trade Executives, Inc. (March 1,
1997).
38
Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon savs Russia is Selling Subs to Iran," New York Times, September 24,
1992. 9.
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209 and the Russian Kilo are discussed below. For a comparison of these two submarines
see Table 2.
Table 2. Comparison of German Type-209 And Russian Kilo 39
Type-209 KILO
Surface/Submerged Displacement (tons/tons) 1660/1850 2500/3000
Length/Beam (m/m) 64.4/6.5 72.6/9.9
Max. Speeds Surface/Submerged (kts/kts) 11/22 10/17
Submerged Horsepower (shp) 4600 5000
Range Surfaced/Speed (nm/kts) 13000/10 6000/7
Range Submerged/Speed (nm/kts) 400/4 400/3
Normal Operating Depth (m) 260 240
Torpedo Tubes/Size (#/mm) 8/533 6/533
Weapons Load* (# torpedoes/# mines) 14/24** 18/24***
Ships Complement (#) 40 52
* Maximum for each type ofweapon, combinations of the two are possible with the Kilo.
** The Type-209 has an optional external mine belt carrying up to 24 mines in addition to full torpedo
loadout.
*** With a full loadout of 18 torpedoes, 6 are stowed in the torpedo tubes and 12 are rack stowed; with a
full loadout of24 mines, 12 are tube loaded (2 per tube), and 12 are stowed on racks.
1. German Type-209
The German Type-209 has been the most successful submarine export program.
Since its introduction in 1971, over 50 Type-209s have been exported to or produced
under license by various counties including most of Latin America, Greece, Turkey, South
39
Information compiled from various sources including: Jane 's Fighting Ships (London: Jane's Information
Group, Limited, 1996), David Miller, Submarines of the World (New York: Orion Books, 1991), and
John Benedict, "Undersea Weapons — Technology Transfer with Anti-ship Implications" brief prepared for
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory May 1996.
24
Korea, and India. Although the Type-209 can be made to order, taking into account the
specific needs of the recipient, the standard model displaces about 1600 tons surfaced and
1800 tons submerged. It is powered by a standard diesel-electric drive capable of speeds
up to 11 kts surfaced and up to 22 kts sprint speed submerged. Carrying up to 14 heavy-
weight anti-ship torpedoes, the Type-209 has a tremendous destructive capability. The
Type-209 can also be fitted with an external mine stow capable of carrying 24 mines in
addition to the full torpedo loadout. 40
The Type-209 is a very capable platform. The four MTU VI 2 diesel engines
supply 2400 hp each and give the submarine a 13,000 nm range at 10 kts on the surface.
The four 1 .8 MW alternators and battery system provide for a submerged range of 400
nm at 4 kts. Its normal operating depth is 260 m and the stowage and auxiliary support
equipment provide an endurance of 60 days. 41
Equipped with a standard surface search radar and both active and passive
medium frequency search and attack sonars, the Type-209 is capable of both surface and
submerged torpedo attack. The 14 AEG SUT Mod 1 wire guided torpedoes with
active/passive homing to 28 km (15.3 nm) at 23 kts or 12 km (6.6 nm) at 35 kts carry a
250 kg warhead and are potent anti-ship weapons. 42
David Miller, Submarines ofthe World, 154-155.




The Type-209 is available for between $100 and $380 million. The follow-on
design with air independent propulsion will be available for approximately $500 million. 43
2. Russian Kilo
The Russian export submarine program is the Kilo-class submarine. The Kilo
program has also been very successful; over 20 have been exported or produced under
license since the first unit was completed in 1982. This submarine is considerably larger
than the Type-209 and can also be built to specification. The standard export model is
known as the 877EKM variant and its follow-on variant is known as Project-636. The
Project-636 is basically the same as the 877EKM except that it more closely resembles
the Russian Navy version because it is quieter and has a higher degree of automation.
The 877EKM variant Kilo exported to Iran and India is another capable platform.
Designed by the Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering Rubin, at St. Petersburg,
the 877EKM has a double hull providing additional space for equipment storage outside
the pressure hull (e.g., the steering gear and high-pressure air bottles). Additionally, the
outer hull is able to absorb impact damage, particularly the bow and stern. The pressure
hull is 5 1 8m long and the overall length is 72.6m. Although it can be made to order, the
typical Kilo displaces 2,500 tons surfaced and 3,000 tons submerged.
43
John Benedict, "Undersea Weapons ~ Technology Transfer with Anti-ship Implications.
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The Kilo has a 32 percent reserve buoyancy (compared with about 13 percent for
U.S. nuclear submarines) providing for a greater safety factor. The Kilo is designed such
that the submarine will remain afloat with either any one compartment and two main
ballast tanks on the same side flooded or the stern compartment and the adjacent main
ballast tank flooded.
44
For surface propulsion, the Kilo has two four-stroke, six cylinder in-line Model 4-
2DL-42M engines with gas turbine superchargers providing 1,500 hp at 700 rpm and
giving the submarine a snorkeling range of 6,000 nm at 7 kts. The two PG-142 DC 1,000
kW generators and associate battery system provide a submerged range 400 nm at 3 kts
and sprint speeds up to 17 kts. 45 The normal operating depth for the Kilo is 240 m, and
the stowage and auxiliary equipment provide an endurance of 45 days without
replenishment and up to 260 hours of underwater travel.
Equipped with a surface search radar, a medium frequency detection and tracking
sonar, and a high frequency attack sonar and armed with 1 8 heavy weight anti-ship
torpedoes or up to 24 anti-ship mines, the Kilo can be a potent adversary. The Russian
export deals usually include 53-65KE wake homing anti-ship torpedoes and TSST-71MS
wire guided ASW torpedoes. 46
44
David Miller, "New Russian Submarine Hunts Export Market," International Defense Review 9 (1994):
52-59.
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In January 1997, Iran took delivery of its third 877EKM Kilo from Russia. The
$600 million deal included training, support, and weapons. 47 Also in January 1997, a
high-level Indian Defense Ministry delegation in St. Petersburg agreed to purchase two
Project-636 Kilo submarines from Russia. The deal was reportedly for $430 million.
Additionally, Defense News has quoted Indian defense officials as saying that New Delhi
would release additional funds in 1997 to build two Type-209. 48
D. CONCLUSION
Although political influence, coalition interoperability, and alliance building are not
the powerful supply-side factors that they were during the Cold War, it is still a buyers'
market for advanced conventional arms. Whether the supplier state is motivated to
maintain its technological base, produce arms for economy of scale, or raise hard currency
from foreign sources, it must actively seek markets for its arms. Suppliers make
attractive deals including the most advanced technology, training, support, and weapons
to attract foreign buyers. Supply-side factors play a role in every weapons transfer;
however, because it is currently a "buyers' market" with respect to conventionally-
powered submarines, this study will focus on the demand-side factors described in the
following chapter.
47
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III. CONVENTIONALLY-POWERED SUBMARINE DEMAND
A INTRODUCTION
Although the supply-side factors presented in the previous chapter make it a
buyer's market when it comes to conventional weapons, it is the demand-side factors that
drive conventional weapons acquisitions. These demand-side factors exert strong
pressures on the recipient state to acquire advanced conventional weapons, such as
submarines. This chapter examines the demand-side factors that drive countries to
acquire conventionally-powered submarines in general. The following two chapters look
at these factors more specifically as they apply to the cases of India and Iran.
B. DEMAND-SIDE FACTORS
The demand-side factors driving conventional weapons acquisition can be divided
into five categories, prestige, political influence, technology, bureaucracy, security
concerns, and war-time replacement. 49 For the purposes of the discussion below, war-
time replacement is omitted because submarines require long lead times to produce and are
not easily replaced during conflict. Additionally, since the end of the Second World War,
no country has been able to acquire submarines while involved in a conflict.
49




A strong navy has been a symbol of national prestige for almost three centuries
and the premier navy for most of that time was the British Royal Navy. For most of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Royal Navy was emulated by other great powers,
particularly the United States, 50 Germany, and Japan. The naval arms race between Great
Britain and Germany at the turn of the twentieth century was particularly fierce and is
attributable as a factor leading to the First World War. 51 The great powers desired bigger
and better ships not only to defeat the ships of their enemy, but also to foster national
recognition in the international system. Theodore Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet" is a
prime example. Initially, national prestige was symbolized by large battleships, then
submarines, and ultimately aircraft carriers.
Today the aircraft carrier remains the ultimate symbol of naval prowess; however,
large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are prohibitively expensive to all but the United
States. Even the Soviet Union at its height was unable to match the U.S. carrier fleet
during the Cold War. Nuclear-powered submarines can also symbolize national prowess;
however, they are also prohibitively expensive. Currently, only five nations operate
nuclear-powered submarines: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.
50
Although it is constitutionally mandated to provide for and maintain a navy (Article I, Section 8), the
types of vessels and aircraft placed into service can be influenced by prestige.
51
For an excellent analysis of the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain at the turn of the
century see Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991).
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Along with ballistic missiles, super-sonic aircraft and large naval vessels, 52 the
conventionally-powered submarine is an attainable advanced weapon that can foster
national prestige. Although possessing submarines alone does not determine great power
status, all the great powers possess submarines. Only the United States and Great
Britain have been able to afford an exclusively nuclear-powered submarine force.
Conventionally-powered submarines are possessed by all the other great powers (France,
Russia, China, and Japan). Possessing a submarine force can be a symbol of national
prestige because submarines have been legitimized by the other great navies.
Since the end ofthe Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar international
system, are emerging nations turning to conventionally-powered submarines as a means of
fostering their position in the new multipolar international system?
2. Political Influence
Being on the receiving end of advanced conventional weapons transfers can
provide the recipient with some political influence over the supplier. This is the mirror
image of the supply-side factor argument made in the previous chapter. Just as the
supplier state may be able to exert some influence over the recipient, the recipient may
welcome that influence and even exploit the relationship. Recipient states may be able to
influence the supplier state to place the recipient under its protection. Relatively weak
52 Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, "Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons:
An Institutional Approach," in Peter J Katzenstein, ed, The Culture ofNational Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 79-113.
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recipient states can influence much more powerful supplier states in this manner. Even a
supplier as powerful of the United States has been influenced by recipients of its arms.
Taiwan during the Quemoy Crisis of 1958 provides a good illustration. 53
Entering into the large economic agreements required for submarine acquisition can
also serve to align the interests of the supplier and recipient. Protecting the economy of
the recipient serves to guarantee payment for the supplier. Pursuing national interests
that are in line with the supplier state, helps ensure the recipient that it can depend on the
supplier for continued support after the sale. Political influence may also play a role in
acquiring conventionally-powered submarines.
3. Technology
Technological imperatives can also drive states to acquire more advanced
weaponry. The transfer of conventionally-powered submarines often includes technical
assistance both during the sale and for a long time afterward. Many of the current
proposals to transfer conventionally-powered submarines include technology transfers
that will enable the recipient to build under license its own follow-on platforms. This
kind of technology transfer can significantly enhance the technological infrastructure of
the recipient and can positively influence its economy as a whole.
53
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 370.
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Additionally, being able to build and maintain its own weapons can foster a
nation's technological self-reliance and thereby enhance its security situation. Although
security concerns as a motivation for acquiring conventionally-powered submarines are
fully developed later in this chapter, in this context, a state that is self-reliant in the
production of its arms would not only be unaffected by potential arms embargoes, it
could dissociate itself from the political influences of the supplier states. The resulting
increased latitude for pursuing that state's interests could be translated to enhanced
security. In this manner, technology transfer may be a motivating factor behind
conventionally-powered submarine acquisition.
4. Bureaucracy
Bureaucratic organizations within governments seek to enhance their position both
within the state apparatus and with respect to their foreign counterparts. 54 This seems to
be particularly true with respect to navies Not only do navies bolster their position
within the state apparatus, but they orient themselves towards the navies of other states
as potential adversaries. Traditionally, navies have fought only other navies; however,
with the development of deep strike land attack cruise missiles, this may be changing.
The possession of advanced naval hardware not only bolsters the position of the navy
within the military and within the government as a whole, it can advance the reputation of
54
See Edward L. Katzenbach, "The Horse Cavalry in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Policy
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Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy," World Politics 17 (October 1991): 1-41.
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the navy within international naval circles. The conventionally-powered submarine is
such a weapon.
Bureaucratic motivations for acquiring submarines are similar to the national
prestige motivations and can have the same result; however, they are on different levels of
analysis. Bureaucratic motivations are on the organizational level rather on the state level
of analysis associated with prestige motivations. On the organizational level, bureaucratic
motivations seek to enhance the position of the organization within the state and/or with
respect to their foreign counterparts. Prestige motivations are on the state level of
analysis and seek to enhance the position of the state within the international hierarchy.
5. Security Concerns
A tremendous amount of literature discusses the nature of states' security
concerns and how they influence state behavior particularly arms acquisitions. For the
purposes of the following discussion, state security is defined as the protection and
preservation its minimum core values: political independence and territorial integrity. 55
This definition is intentionally narrow, purposely omitting aspects such as regime
security and the concept of national security. 56 Although both internal and external
55
Talukder Maniruzzaman, "The Security of Small States in the Third World," Canberra Papers on
Strategy and Defense, No. 25 (Canberra, Australia: The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The
Australian National University, 1982), 15.
50
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factors affect a state's security;
57
since this study focuses on naval arms acquisitions
which have little utility with respect to internal security threats, internal security aspects
are ignored.
The external security of every state depends on its military capabilities and/or
those of its allies. In order to be secure, states must be able to deter external aggression or
effectively deal with it through negotiations and/or armed conflict. Traditionally, this has
meant balancing the capabilities of other states within the region; however, the global
nature of conflict in the twentieth century has changed the scope. Advanced weaponry
such as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for some
states to intervene well outside their traditional regions. While regional powers are still of
concern and can be significant influences on arms acquisitions, 58 the United States as the
last remaining superpower has become a security concern of many states. Those states
which are not aligned with the United States, may perceive that there is no one to defend
them. Is balancing the United States a motivating factor for acquiring conventionally-
powered submarines by these countries?
5
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C. CONCLUSION
Many demand-side factors exert strong pressures on states to acquire advanced
conventional weapons, such as submarines. Each weapons transfer is influenced by
different combinations of the supply and demand-side factors, each to varying degrees.
For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that it is a "buyer's market" with respect to
conventionally-powered submarines so the focus is on the demand-side factors. Although
documented evidence of motivations for any weapons acquisition simply does not exist,
motivations may be able to be inferred by examining details of the deal and the proposed
methods of employment.
Weapons acquired for prestige may lack direct military applications or may be
beyond the capabilities to be successfully employed in combat. Weapons acquired as
part of larger deals may indicate political influence as a motive. Technological imperatives
may be manifested in the transfer of advanced technologies along with the actual weapons
transfer. The particular choice ofweapons and/or evidence of bribes or kickbacks can
imply that bureaucratic politics are playing a part in the acquisition. Security concerns as
a motivation can be evident in the nature of the weapons acquired and the proposed
methods of their employment. Some weapons by their nature, such as tanks, can be
employed against both internal and external security threats; while other weapons can
only be employed against one or the other. Submarines cannot be employed effectively
against internal threats; therefore, if a state acquires submarines in response to security
concerns it must perceive some sort of external security threat.
36
The following two chapters assess the motivations behind the recent submarine
acquisitions ofboth India and Iran as case studies to ascertain if balancing the threat




IV. CASE STUDY I: INDIA
A. INTRODUCTION
In January 1997, the Indian Defense Ministry concluded a deal with Russia to
purchase two Project-636 Kilo submarines for approximately $430 million. 59 It has also
been reported that the latest Indian defense budget will include funds to build two more
submarines to be in service by 2005. 60 India produced two German Type-209s under
license at the Mazagon Dock Ltd., Bombay during the 1980s. Whether the submarines to
be built are of German or Russian design is still under debate.
This chapter examines the possible motivations behind India's acquisition of these
submarines to see ifbalancing the U.S. naval presence in the region has played a role. The
chapter begins with an overview of India's relevant national statistics and those of its
navy, and then takes a detailed look at its submarine force. After examining India's
submarine capabilities and proposed methods of employment, the Indian motivations for
acquiring the submarines are inferred.
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India is a major regional power. Its population of over 950 million makes it the
second most populous country after China. India's GDP in 1995 was estimated at $330
billion, which equates to roughly $1,400 per capita. 61 Its territories cover some 3.2
million square kilometers and because of its peninsular shape, India's coastline stretches
some 7,000 kilometers. 62 Additionally, India's coastline is augmented by 1,400
kilometers of island and rock territories extending far into both the Arabian Sea and the
Bay of Bengal. Over 470 island territories comprise the Lakshadweep Group in the
Arabian Sea, and 723 islands stretching over 900 kilometers in the Bay ofBengal
constitute the Andaman and Nicobar Groups (the nearest of which lies more than 1000
kilometers from the mainland). 63 Defense expenditures in 1995 were $8.3 billion,
supporting a military of 1,145,000 personnel and a navy of 55,000. 64
2. The Indian Navy
The Indian Navy is the largest navy in the region. The Indian surface navy
consists of 26 major surface combatants including 2 aircraft carriers (one is in the process
61
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of being scrapped), 5 destroyers, 19 frigates, 44 patrol and coastal combatants, 20 mine
countermeasure ships, 9 amphibious ships, and 27 support and miscellaneous ships. The
Indian Navy also operates 18 submarines including 8 Kilos, 4 Type 209/1500, and 6
Foxtrots
65
Indian naval doctrine stresses being able to "seek and destroy enemy units heading
for our offshore assets, islands and merchant shipping."66 The specific missions of the
Indian Navy have been articulated as:
• Protecting the mainland and island territories from seaborne invasion,
• Protecting the territorial waters, EEZ [Exclusive Economics Zone] and other
off shore assets,
• Protecting India's Sea Lanes of Communication,
• Safeguarding the nation from gunboat diplomacy, and
• Safeguarding India's interests in contiguous waters67
According to Admiral V. S. Shekhawat, Chief ofthe Indian Naval Staff, the role of
Indian naval forces in serving Indian national interests lie more in the diplomatic sphere,
"fostering interaction between countries, assisting in disaster relief, and complementing
each other in training and cooperation." He goes on to say:
If the countries of the region are left free from outside interference, history
shows the potential for conflict will considerably reduce. The Indian
Ocean states have much to gain from profitable trade, cooperation, and
65
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avoidance of maritime conflict. National naval forces should, therefore, be
seen more as an insurance against the unpredictable than as a requirement
against perceived geostrategic threats in the region, [sic]68
3. The Indian Submarine Force
The Indian submarine force plays a vital role in accomplishing overall navy
missions. The 18 submarines currently in service in the Indian Navy are of three classes.
There are six older Russian Foxtrots, eight 877EKM Kilos, and four Type-209s (two built
in Germany and two produced under license in India). The Foxtrots are all scheduled to
be decommissioned by 2000. 69
According to Commodore Bhim S. Uppal, Indian Navy, (Ret.) Director ofthe
Submarine Arm between 1984 and 1989 and former commander ofone of India's front-
line conventionally-powered submarines (the first to have completed over 1,000 hours
submerged), the Indian Navy will continue to operate and modernize its submarine force
because submarines provide the following:
• the most effective weapons platform for expenditure
• great flexibility
• counter surface ASW forces effectively
• multi-mission platforms (ASUW, Special Forces, I&W, ASW)
• covert and deployable platform without political ramifications
• ability to operate without supporting escorts.
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The operational doctrine of the Indian submarine force is divided into three
categories: infrastructure, training, and tactics. 70
a. Infrastructure
India stresses its shore support infrastructure for its submarine force
because as Uppal points out, "without infrastructure, no country can keep a submarine at
sea for optimum time periods." The Indian submarine shore support infrastructure
includes battery maintenance, torpedo and weapons support, maintenance facilities,
demagnetizing and degaussing facilities, and acoustic testing facilities. The submarine
maintenance program is divided into four echelons:
• Level 1 Cleaning and normal operating maintenance
• Level 2 At sea or in-boat repairs using spares carried on board
• Level 3 In-port, pierside upkeep maintenance
• Level 4 Dockyard (Drydock) or shipyard maintenance
Indian submarine maintenance is quite good, but it has not been without its
problems. In particular, the batteries supplied by the Russians were not designed for the
warm waters ofthe Indian Ocean and had to be replaced with batteries made in India
under license.
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b. Training
Indian submarine force training consists of four phased requirements for
certification for operational patrol (a process which is similar to U.S. submarine force
requirements). The first phase consists of in-port inspection by Flotilla Staff to assess
whether the submarine is safe to take to sea. These inspections are conducted after a 50
percent change of crew, after repair periods greater than nine months or major hull repairs,
and after change of command. The second phase consists of safety of ship
demonstrations at sea in shallow water. Trim dives, safety drills, and tests for sea-
worthiness including evolutions such as anchoring, bottoming, etc. The third phase is
weapon workups (torpedo-firing, mine-laying, etc.) conducted by a submarine on its own.
Each submarine conducts 10-12 exercise shots per year. The final phase is weapons
firings in concert with other forces and multi-ship exercises. Once the ship has completed
this cycle, it is certified until one ofthe conditions mentioned earlier occurs.
c Tactics
Indian submarine force tactics are quite sophisticated. The preparation for
"war patrol" begins with a screw change to the war reserve propellers. These screws will
have already been inspected to insure no defects or damage to minimize noise emanated
by the submarine. Once all the shore preparations and weapons loadout are completed,
the ship will depart under cover of darkness with a small craft escort for navigational
assistance and sound masking. Once outside the harbor and as soon as sufficient water is
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beneath the keel (30m), the submarine will submerge and commence patrol at patrol speed
(2 kts).
While on patrol, the submarine will maintain emissions control (EMCON),
a receive-only mode where no signals of any kind are transmitted. Communications are
received via very low frequency (VLF) radio. During the day the submarine will remain
submerged; at night it will snorkel to recharge its batteries. The submarine will normally
snorkel until the battery is folly charged or until daylight. The battery is normally not
allowed to go below 80 percent (it takes 10-12 hours at submerged patrol speeds to
deplete the battery to 80 percent), and a 95 percent charge is sought nightly. While
snorkeling, the boat travels at 5-6 kts, prepositioning itself for submerged operations.
The submarine is most vulnerable to detection when it is snorkeling;
however, it is equipped with an electronic surveillance measures (ESM) mast to detect
enemy radar while the submarine is snorkeling. The submarine will secure snorkeling and
submerge upon receiving any ESM detection. It must then wait, periodically exposing
only the ESM mast to verify no hostile contacts before recommencing snorkeling.
The normal sonar tactic is to place the sonar above the layer and flood
down aft to put as much of the submarine as possible below the layer. This is a
sophisticated sonar tactic and is by no means easy; however, it does make the submarine
even more difficult to detect. Although it is beyond the scope of this project to folly
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develop the acoustics and oceanography involved in this tactic, Figure 2 gives a graphical
representation of the acoustics involved. 71
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Figure 2. ASW Acoustics
Courtesy ofthe U.S. Naval Institute Press
Each submarine crew is trained for passive-only sonar approaches and
target solutions and are efficient in torpedo tactics employing wake-homing torpedoes and
mining operations. The German Type-209/1500 can be equipped with a jettisonable mine
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belt capable of carrying up to twenty-four mines without interfering with the torpedo
loadout.
According to Uppal, the main threat of detection is from ASW helicopters
with dipping sonar. To avoid being detected, the submarine will turn its stern towards
the helicopter, approach the bottom to within 3-5 m, slow to 1-2 lets, and "creep away."
If detected, the submarine "clears datum" by sprinting away at 10-12 kts for 10-15 miles.
The stated mission priority of India's submarine force includes anti-
surface warfare (ASUW), Surveillance, Special Forces, anti-submarine warfare (ASW),
and providing services for training. However, as noted by Uppal, to sell the platform to
the politicians "ASW was the uppermost mission and ASUW [was] last in the list."72
B. INDIAN MOTIVATIONS BEHIND SUBMARINE ACQUISITION
It must be understood at the outset of this discussion that documented evidence of
motivations for any weapon acquisition simply is not available. However, by examining
the proposed employment methods of particular weapons, it may be possible to infer the
motivations behind the acquisition.
It is unlikely that prestige has played a significant role in the recent Indian
conventionally-powered submarine acquisitions. India already operates the largest navy
in the region and its force includes an aircraft carrier. Additionally, the Indian navy
72 Bhim S. Uppal, "A Third World Submarine Perspective.
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operated an ex-Soviet Charlie class nuclear-powered submarine which it leased from the
USSR from 1988 to 1991.
Prestige as a motivating factor may be more appropriate when discussing the
Indian nuclear-powered submarine project. Currently, the Indians are pursuing an
indigenously constructed nuclear-powered submarine. The project has priority over their
new aircraft carrier program and is taking funds from all other naval projects. The nuclear
propulsion system has already been tested at shore and actual submarine construction is
scheduled to begin in 1997. 73 Unless the Indians pursue multiple hulls of this design, the
tremendous effort expended on this one submarine will add little tactical advantage
suggesting prestige as a motivating factor.
Even though it appears that Russia was able to make a more attractive deal than
its western counterparts, political influences may have played a role in India's decision to
purchase the Russian Kilo over other submarines currently available on the market.
Although there are no formal alliances between Russia and India and there is little
likelihood of direct military assistance in the event of an actual war, the purchase of these
submarines certainly fosters friendship on both sides. Russia is on the receiving end of
desperately needed hard currency, and Russian support personnel provide a presence that
could be exploited for future political influence. India, by becoming a significant arms
Jane 's Fighting Ships, 288.
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recipient, aligns itself with Russia in the hopes that it will be able to exert some political
influence over Russia to offset the perceived threats posed by China and Pakistan.
A technology transfer to build future hulls of the Russian design in India would
most certainly be welcome, but that deal has yet to be concluded. Additionally, India
already possesses most of this technology. The Russian design is not revolutionary by
any means, and India has already indigenously produced of two Type-209s in the 1980s
and is currently producing a nuclear-powered submarine of its own design.
Hard evidence of bureaucratic motives is extremely difficult to find; however, the
allegations of malpractices related to conventionally-powered submarines procurement
would certainly suggest some evidence of it. 74 Although it is beyond the scope of this
project to prove that bureaucratic motivations exist, it is safe to say that even if present,
they would not be sufficient to be the sole motivation. The size of the $430 million
submarine deal in the light of austere Indian defense spending, in general and in the navy
in particular, suggests that additional motivating factors must be involved.
Security concerns tend to be the traditional motivation behind arms acquisitions,
and this appears to be the case with India's recent conventionally-powered submarine
acquisition. India's historic external security concerns lie with China and Pakistan. While
the threat presented by China is non-naval in character, the threat from Pakistan has a
distinct naval component. According to Admiral V. S. Shekhawat, although the Indian
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Ocean region has known little serious maritime conflict (mostly exported from Europe),
the one naval conflict of purely local origin was the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, "the
roots of which also lay in historical influences still unresolved."75
The Pakistani surface navy consists of 1 1 major surface combatants (3 destroyers
and 8 frigates) and 13 patrol and coastal combatants. The Pakistani submarine force,
which has been described as the largest and best trained Third World submarine force,76
consists of 9 submarines, including 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne, and 3 midget submarines. In
September 1994, France agreed to sell three additional Agosta-dass 90B diesel-electric
submarines with air-independent propulsion to Pakistan. Pakistan will pay $950 million
for the three submarines, associated training, upgrades of its Karachi shipyard, supply of
required machine tools, and guaranteed logistical support. The deal includes a significant
transfer of the related technology as well. The first hull is to be built in France and
delivered in 1999. The second unit will be fabricated in France, but assembled in
Pakistan. The third hull will be built entirely in Pakistan. 77
According to Rahul Roy-Chaudhary, a research officer at the Indian Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses,
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It is clear that the advanced technology systems present in the Pakistani
submarines would enable the vessels to pose a far more complex threat to
Indian naval merchant ships. The defence of Karachi would also be
enhanced further. Such a state of affairs would be exacerbated by the
natural erosion of India's own submarine fleet in the next few years....At
present, the new advanced technology submarines to be acquired simply
represent a modernisation of Pakistan's submarine force. The boats will
not tilt the naval balance in the Indian subcontinent in Pakistan's favour.
They, however, represent a decrease in the Indian Navy's edge over the
Pakistani Navy in warfare.78
While these naval developments could pose a direct threat to India, the Indians are more
concerned with a "potential implosion of the state of Pakistan" rather than Pakistani
naval aggression.
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The 1990s have been austere times for defense spending worldwide and India is no
exception. India is definitely shifting from a power-projection naval force to one oriented
on defense; however, the role of conventionally-powered submarines will continue to
expand. In the words ofBrigadier G. B. Reddi, (Ret.),
Today [the Indian Navy] have wisely restricted themselves to a sea
control role only, which can be performed by a more cost-effective naval
force. The naval thrust should, therefore, be positively towards the
development of smaller, faster and maneuverable surface ships and stealth
submarines offering fewer prime targets and greater strategic options at
more economic life-cycle costs. 80
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According to Vijay Madan, Lt. Gen., Indian Army (Ret.), "the aim should be to possess
fast surface units armed with missiles, and a much larger number of submarines, all
supported by land-based maritime aircraft and fighters. Such engagements should not
take place outside the range of our land-based aircraft. 81 This strategy is designed to
counter the threats posed by Pakistan and China, but it would work equally as well if
countering limited naval action conducted by the United States.
Although not considered as a traditional security threat, the United States has had
a long history of involvement in the Indian Ocean and continues routinely to deploy
carrier battlegroups and amphibious ready groups to the Indian Ocean. During the 1962
Indo-China War, the United States promised to send a carrier task force into the Indian
Ocean as a measure of support. It did not arrive until 1971, just after India's naval
victory over Pakistan. This delay is still considered by many Indians as the "great
betrayal."
82 The recent U.S. supply of $370 million worth of arms to Pakistan following
the Brown amendment in 1995 is the latest "thorn" in Indo-U.S. relations. 83
Although there has been some movement towards accommodation between the
United States and India, it has its limits. According to Nalini K. Jha, an Indian specialist
in Indo-U.S. relations,
1
Vijay Madan, "The Defense Budget," 42-43.
82
Interview with Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Monterey, Calif., 24 April 1997.
83
Singh, ed., Indian Defence Yearbook 1997-98, 16.
52
It [would] be misleading to ignore undercurrents of differences in Indo-U.S.
relations. On the question of Kashmir, for instance, Washington, unlike
New Delhi, has never regarded Kashmir as an undisputed territory. In
fact, the process of Indo-U.S. accommodation has been punctuated by
sticky patches of differences on issues such as arms supply to Pakistan,
(in the 1990s), activities of the Sikh terrorists in the United States, the
Bhopal gas disaster of 1984, which involved a U.S. multinational
corporation, India's testing of an intermediate missile, Agni, in 1989, New
Delhi's withdrawal (under domestic pressures) of refueling facility to the
U.S.-led multinational force during the Gulf War of 1991, trade matters,
especially intellectual property rights, alleged violations of human rights
and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), environmental
pollution, India's sale ofwheat to Cuba, and so on. 84
Although the United States and India have conducted a joint naval exercise consisting of
two destroyers and two frigates in May 1992, 85 the large U.S. naval build up in the
Persian Gulf and their employment against Iraq are a source of tension for India.
According to Dr. A.K. Pasha, Assistant Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi,
...U.S. domination of the Gulf region is otherwise marginalising our
influence in the area. This is not to deny the benefits from low oil prices
resulting from Iraq's defeat. But it is a matter for concern that the U.S. has
been going about defending its interests in a rather aggressive manner. But
we must neither blindly endorse the U.S. strategy in the area nor suspect it
on every issue, but should redouble our diplomatic efforts to quickly
assert, protect and promote our interests in the region which are mainly
related to oil, immigrants and security. Once tension is removed, the huge
Western naval presence which is cause for concern may decline in the
neighbourhood of India. 86
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Again according to Nalini K. Jha, the thorniest long range question concerning
Indo-U.S. relations is the still unresolved status of India as a partner or merely a camp
follower.
History does not suggest that Washington would give much to the Indian
view on global matters and India is not going to completely forgo its
autonomy in international relations. India's geo-strategic location, its
having been a seat of a great ancient civilisation, its socio-cultural milieu,
the ideals of its freedom struggle and democratic political system did not
allow it to do so in the 1950s, and will not permit it to do that half a
century later.
87
In order for India to maintain its autonomy and avoid being merely a camp
follower of the United States, it must be prepared to balance the conventional military
forces of the United States.
C. CONCLUSION
India is a major regional power and as such has maintained and will continue to
maintain a formidable navy. In addition to operating the region's largest surface fleet,
India has operated a submarine force continuously since its initial purchase of three
Foxtrots from the USSR in the late 1960s. The Indian Navy is projected to continue to
upgrade and modernize its submarine force well into the twenty-first century.
Although prestige, political influences, technological transfer, and bureaucratic
motives may all have played some role in India's recent decision to acquire additional
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conventionally-powered submarines from Russia, the primary motives were security
concerns. The acquisition ofnew submarines to replace older ones can be viewed in the
context of several real and perceived threats. Traditional Indian security concerns are
focused toward China to the North and Pakistan to the West. The threat from China is
not currently naval in nature and appears to be a primary motivation for India's nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs. The threat from Pakistan also contains a nuclear
component, but it has a large naval component as well. Pakistan's continued submarine
modernization program, coupled with its recent submarine purchase from France, is most
likely the primary motivation behind India's recent submarine purchase.
Although not one of India's primary security concerns, evidence suggests that
balancing the U.S. naval presence in the region may have played a small role in the
decision to purchase additional conventionally-powered submarines. The United States
as the sole remaining superpower and the largest naval presence in the region, is certainly
capable of exercising cniise missile diplomacy on India, however unlikely this may be.
Additionally, India continues to find itself opposing the United States on issues such as
human rights violations and nuclear proliferation policies. Avoiding being merely a camp
follower of the United States and maintaining India's autonomy requires balancing the
capabilities of the United States. In this light, deterring the United States from exercising
cruise missile diplomacy could be considered one of India's national security objectives.
India's possession of nuclear weapons may not be sufficient to deter the United
States from exercising cruise missile diplomacy particularly since India currently lacks the
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means to strike the United States with such weapons. India's possession of a
conventionally-powered submarine force, on the other hand, may be capable of denying
the United States the opportunity of exercising cruise missile diplomacy by raising the
potential costs involved. India is well aware of U.S. capabilities and must be prepared to
balance them or "pay the price of weakness."
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V. CASE STUDY II: IRAN
A. INTRODUCTION
In January 1997, Iran took delivery of its third Kilo class conventionally-
powered submarine from Russia. The $600 million per hull deal included training,
technical support, and weapons (including wake-homing heavy-weight torpedoes)
significantly enhancing Iran's layered littoral warfare capabilities. 88
Unlike Indo-U.S. relations which are accommodating overall, but not without
friction, Iran and the United States are openly hostile towards one another. Iran has
labeled the United States as the 'Great Satan,' and has mounted a strong opposition
movement targeted at U.S. 'hegemony.' The United States meanwhile continues to
accused Iran ofbeing a 'rogue' state, the largest exporter ofterrorism, and a major
drug-producing/transit country. Additionally, a U.S. national emergency declaration
remains in effect for Iran, although some of the controls under that measure have been
removed since it was instituted in 1979. Current U.S. policy towards Iran is aimed at
"changing the behavior ofthe Iranian government."89
This chapter examines the possible motivations behind Iran's acquisition of
these submarines to see if balancing the U.S. naval presence in the region has played a
Cordesman and Hasim, Iran: Dilemmas ofDual Containment, 255-258.
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role. The chapter begins with an overview of Iran's relevant national statistics and
those of its navy, and then takes a detailed look at both the support and operations of
Iran's submarine force. After examining Iran's submarine capabilities and proposed
methods of employment, the Iranian motivations for acquiring submarines are
inferred.
1. Relevant Statistics
Iran is the largest Islamic fundamentalist state and one ofthe dominant powers
in the Gulf region. It has definite regional aspirations including consolidating its naval
superiority in the Persian Gulf and controlling the Straits of Hormuz. 90
Iran has a population of 66,769,800 and territories stretching over 1,648,000
square kilometers. Iran's GDP in 1995 was $62.5 billion or approximately $4,900 per
capita. Iranian defense expenditures in 1995 were $2.5 billion and the 1996 defense
budget was increased 38 percent to $3.4 billion, the largest increase in the region. The
Iranian military has 513,000 personnel of which 18,000 comprise the Iranian Navy. 91
Iran's coastline extends over 3,180 kilometers running the entire length ofthe
Persian Gulf and extending 600 kilometers along the Gulf of Oman. The Persian Gulf,
which covers about 240,000 square kilometers and stretches 990 kilometers from
Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1997), 29.
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Shatt al-Arab to the Straits of Hormuz, is dominated by the Iranian navy. The Gulf is
about 340 kilometers wide at its maximum width and about 225 kilometers wide for
most of its length. 92 Its average depth of only 26 meters and its maximum depth of 88
meters makes both submarine and ASW operations difficult.
Iran also occupies the strategic north shore along the length of the Straits of
Hormuz which join the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The Straits ofHormuz
are about 180 kilometers long and range from 60 to 100 kilometers wide. 93 These
straits are strategically significant because over 20 percent of the world oil supply
flows through them. 94
2. The Iranian Navy
Not unexpectedly, Iran possesses the largest navy of all the Gulf states. Its
surface component consists of five major combatants including two destroyers and
three frigates, and forty-eight patrol and coastal combatants. The Iranian navy is the
only Gulf navy aside from Oman to conduct extensive and meaningful training. In
1993, the Iranian navy conducted 36 exercises. That number was increased to 49 in
1994, and to 57 in 1995. The Iranian submarines participated in these exercises for
the first time in 1995.
92
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The Iranian Navy is by no means a blue water navy, but it is consolidating its
naval presence in the Persian Gulf and increasing its ability to control the Strait of
Hormuz. Admiral Shamkani, Head of the Iranian Navy, has said that the recently
acquired submarines will "allow the consolidation of Iranian naval superiority in the
entire Persian Gulf and the Strait ofHormuz. "s ' Although it is unlikely that the
Iranians will be able to accomplish complete sustained control of the Straits in the
near-term, they certainly will be capable of inflicting significant disruption of
commercial traffic until the submarine threat is neutralized or eliminated.
3. The Iranian Submarine Force
The possession of three 877EKM Kilo submarines purchased from Russia
significantly enhances the Iranian navy's ability to dominate the Gulf and perhaps
control the Straits by introducing a whole new dimension to Iranian naval capabilities.
Iran took delivery of its first Kilo in November 1992, the second in August 1993, and
the third in January 1997. This last submarine was launched in 1994, conducted sea
trials in the Baltic Sea, and left Russia in late November 1996. It transited under a
Russian flag with a combined Russian/Iranian crew. 96 The Kilos currently are
stationed at Bandar Abbas in the Strait of Hormuz, but are scheduled to be moved to a




specially constructed base in Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman 110 kilometers west of
Pakistan and 400 kilometers east of the Straits ofHormuz.
a. Support
The Iranian infrastructure supporting its submarine force is definitely
lacking. Currently, Bandar Abbas is the only port which can accommodate
submarines and submarine maintenance, so all support is provided from this one
facility. A specially built submarine base is being constructed in Chah Bahar; it will
eventually be the main support facility for the three submarines. It is believed that
once stationed at Chah Bahar, the submarines will operate predominately in the less
constrictive waters of the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. 97
Iran's introduction of its submarine capabilities has not been without
difficulties. Iranian submarine operations were limited in 1 996 due to "significant
operational problems" including battery and other material problems. 98 The Russian
made batteries supplied with the submarines were not designed to operate in the
warm waters ofthe Gulf. Iran turned to India which experienced similar problems
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with its Kilos in the late 1980s for help. New batteries have been imported from India
and already may have been replaced in the first two submarines."
Although Iran has had some difficulty instituting its submarine
capabilities, the Iranians are working to overcome these setbacks and are improving
their infrastructure to support a more robust operational schedule. Eventually, Iran
may have the capability to surge-deploy all three Kilo 's during a crisis or,
alternatively, maintain a near continuous at-sea presence with at least one unit. 100
b. Operations
On 5 March 1995, Iran conducted full scale naval maneuvers including
its Kilo submarines for the first time. 101 The Kilos have participated in many
exercises conducted by Iran including the latest military maneuvers in February 1 997
in and around the Gulf of Oman. This was a large naval exercise of over 2000 naval
personnel including the naval division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. 102
The submarine operations have continued to become increasingly complex, and Iran
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has indicated that it has successfully test fired both advanced wake-homing and wire-
guided Russian torpedoes. 103
Although the Iranians have not revealed their adopted tactics, it is
reasonable to assume that they are similar to that of the Russians because the Iranian
submarine crews were all trained by the Russians. It is also possible that the Iranians
have adopted some tactics of the Indians because of the close association between
those two countries with regard to submarine matters.
Possible missions for the submarines include coastal defense, special
operations, mining, and commerce raiding. Although it is likely to be several years
before Iran's submarine crews can be considered experienced enough for the full range
of combat operations, the U.S. Navy believes that Iran has at least one crew capable
of undemanding missions such as mine-laying. 104 This capability is of considerable
consequence considering the Iranian submarine purchase included some 1,800 Russian
mines, bringing the Iranian mine inventory to several thousand older Russian and
Yugoslavian-built models. 105 Although these may be older models, it must be
remembered that it was World War II vintage mines that caused such tremendous
damage to USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) during the U.S. intervention in the Iran-
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Iraq War and to the USS Princeton (CG-59) and USS Tripoli (LPH-10) during the
Gulf War. 106
Iran's submarine force provides a significant new dimension to its
layered littoral warfare strategy. Iran's mix of surface ships, land based aircraft and
missiles, and its three Kilo submarines not only provides a credible defense against
attack by Iran's Gulf neighbors, these forces can threaten and intimidate shipping in
the Gulf and cause significant initial or short-term damage. A recent report indicates
the Iranian Defense Ministry believes Iran is able to control the Persian Gulf. 107
Although the ability to control the Gulf is debatable for the time being, the three Kilos
acquired from Russia will play an important role in any Iranian plans to interdict ship
traffic in the Strait or in defending their coastline from seaborne attack.
B. IRANIAN MOTIVATIONS BEHIND SUBMARINE ACQUISITION
It must be understood at the outset of this discussion that documented
evidence of motivations for Iranian weapons acquisitions is simply not available. It
may be possible, however, to infer the motivations behinds certain weapons
acquisitions by examining the proposed methods of employment of the weapon. The
inevitable gap between Iranian statements and actions and Iran's support of terrorism
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and extremism make inferences difficult. However, it may be possible to illuminate
some of the motivations behind their recent submarine acquisition.
Iran's submarine acquisition has some aspects of prestige. Iran possesses the
largest navy of all the Gulf states and is currently the only one which operates
submarines. However, the prestige associated with Iran's submarines is probably
more a result of the acquisition rather than a motivating factor for it. The stated
objectives of the Iranian navy are to consolidate its naval superiority in the Gulf and
to control the Straits of Hormuz. While it is certainly prestigious to possess regional
naval superiority the and ability to control the Straits of Hormuz, unfortunately for
Iran, its regional superiority is blunted by the presence United States. The United
States remains by far the largest naval presence in the region and would certainly not
tolerate disruption of oil flow through the straits.
Although no formal alliances exist between Iran and Russia and there is little
likelihood of direct military assistance in the event of an actual war, the purchase of
these submarines certainly fosters friendship on both sides. Russia is on the receiving
end of desperately needed hard currency, and Russian support personnel provide a
Russian presence in Iran that could be exploited for future political influence. Iran
receives weapons capable of affecting the balance of power in the region and the
technical assistance to maintain their operation. Because the Iranians chose the
Russian model over the available western models also suggests an alignment
juxtaposed to the United States.
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Iran's submarine purchase from Russia did not include the technological
transfer required for future licensed production of submarines in Iran; however, a
considerable amount of technology transfer was included in the deal. The maintenance
support required for these submarines is not trivial and Russia, desperate to remain a
major supplier on the world market, is driven to provide the assistance Iran requires.
Although there may be bureaucratic motives for Iran acquiring these
submarines; evidence is lacking, and the magnitude of the other factors involved
suggests that even if present, bureaucratic motives are not one of the principal factors.
Security concerns appear to be the primary motivation for Iran's submarine
acquisition. Iraq remains Iran's primary regional security concern, but the threat
posed by Iraq does not contain a naval component. While Iran also shares borders
with Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan, and relations with each of these
is far from cordial, the threat posed by each of these countries is also non-naval in
character. Iran also shares a border with Pakistan, but relations between Iran and
Pakistan are quite good. Iran and Pakistan conducted joint naval maneuvers in the
Gulf ofOman in 1994, the first such exercise since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.
Two Iranian warships conducted port visits in Pakistan in February 1996, and Iranian
and Pakistani naval units are scheduled to hold joint maneuvers in Iranian waters in
mid 1997. 108
108
"Iran's Naval Forces: A Shadow across the Gulf?" Jane 's Navy International, 14.
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The long-standing ideological, political, and strategic tensions between Iran and
Saudi Arabia present a major security concern. A naval component to the threat
posed Saudi Arabia does exist; however, Iran's naval forces are definitely superior to
those of Saudi Arabia. Much to Iran's distaste, Saudi Arabia continues to receive
backing from the United States; and the United States continues to be the largest naval
presence in the Gulf. Because the United States is the only naval power in the region
capable of inflicting its will on an unwilling Iran, the Iranian submarine acquisition can
be seen as an attempt to balance the overwhelming U.S. naval presence in the Gulf.
Iran has stood by and watched not only the overwhelming defeat of Iraq by
the United States during the Gulf War, but the steady buildup ofU.S. naval forces
deployed to the Persian Gulf since the war's end. In 1992, the regional U.S. command
was upgraded to a three-star admiral's post, and in 1995, the U.S. Navy reconstituted
the force as the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which was disbanded in 1947. Designating the naval
force in the Persian Gulf as a numbered fleet elevated its status to that of the U.S.
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.
Currently, the United States routinely operates 20 to 35 warships including an aircraft
carrier in the Persian Gulf.
Along with the U.S. naval buildup in the Gulf, the United States continues to
pursue policies aimed at changing Iran's behavior. The United States has levied
numerous sanctions aimed at Iran, including both import and export sanctions. The
freeze of assets instituted in 1979 remains in effect, and there is also a ban on indirect
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assistance, and bans on bilateral assistance. As stated in the latest U.S. Security
Strategy document,
[U.S.] policy is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian
government in several key areas, including its efforts to obtain
weapons of mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism
and groups that oppose the peace process, its attempts to undermine
friendly governments in the region, and its development of offensive
military capabilities which threaten our Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) partners and the flow of oil. Pending changes in Iran's
behavior, our goal is to contain and reduce its ability to threaten our
interests. We also seek to coordinate with key allies to maximize
pressures on Iran to change its course. 109
And finally, Iran has witnessed three separate U.S. cruise missile attacks on
Iraq since the end ofGulfWar. It is obvious that Iraq could do nothing to prevent
these strikes, and it is just as obvious the United States could as easily attack Iran. Or
could it?
The Iranian submarines add a whole new dimension to Iran's layered littoral
defensive strategy against possible U.S. cruise missile attacks from naval vessels. As
discussed earlier, by operating these submarines, Iran might be able to raise the
threshold for U.S. intervention in Iranian regional affairs and thereby deter the United
States from conducting cruise missile attacks on Iran in situations short of actual war.
The official Iranian stated position is that the submarines are for defensive
purposes only. Rear-Admiral Ashkbus Danehkar, a senior Iranian navy commander,
* The White House. A National Security Strategyfor a New Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, May 1997). 27.
68
has rejected reports from foreign media sources that the Iran acquired the submarines
to satisfy offensive objectives saying, "the navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran will
never be a threat to friendly and neighboring countries." 110 The Commander of Iran's
ground forces, General Ahmad Dadbin, reinforced that the submarines were strictly
defensive in nature saying the submarines are "not a threat to any country and Iran
will only use them for defensive purposes," but he went on to say Iranian forces were
"ready for reprisal action" against the United States. 111 Another Iranian armed forces
command official reinforced this notion by saying, "The Iranian armed forces have
reached the peak of their combat readiness and are capable of repulsing any U.S.
provocation in the Gulf zone." 112
C. CONCLUSION
Iran aspires to be a major regional power, and as such can be expected to
continue to expand its naval capabilities. Although prestige, political influences,
technological transfer, and bureaucratic motives all may have played some role in
Iran's decision to acquire submarines, the primary motives were security concerns.
Iranian security concerns are primarily non-naval in nature with the exception of the
110
"Senior Navy Commander says new submarine no threat to neighbors." BBC Summaries of World
Broadcasts (27 January 1997).
111
"Russian-Made Submarine Delivered." Arab Press Service Diplomat Recorder 46 no. 4(19 January
1997).
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"Iran Takes Delivery of Third Submarine Bought from Russia," BBC Summaries of World
Broadcasts (28 January 1997).
69
United States. Iran's acquisition of these submarines is the best case of a regional
power attempting to balance the overwhelming superiority of the United States.
The Iranian submarines possess an offensive capability, however, initiating
any kind of offensive naval action such as securing the straits would bring swift
defeat. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that Iran would seriously consider closing
the straits because Iran must transport oil through the straits as well. Currently, Iran
is not capable of preventing other traffic through the straits while maintaining its own.
The defensive nature of these submarines, particularly when combined with
Iran's layered littoral defenses, may possibly deny the United States the ability to
exercise its cruise missile diplomacy with the ease it has with Iraq. Iran is
ideologically opposed to the United States and is well aware of U.S. capabilities;
therefore, it must be prepared to balance the United States or "pay the price of
weakness."
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VI. AFFORDING CONVENTIONALLY-POWERED SUBMARINES
A. INTRODUCTION
Supply-side and demand-side factors are not the only issues involved in the
acquisition of conventionally-powered submarines; the ability of the recipient to afford
them is also an issue. Although economic constraints can be overcome when a nation is
highly motivated to acquire expensive conventional weapons to counter perceived
security threats, economic considerations can play a role in a nation's decision to acquire
submarines. By using statistical analysis, this chapter lays the foundation for building a
predictive model ofwhen emerging countries will be able to afford submarines ifthey are
so motivated.
B. METHODOLOGY
The basic concept for this study came from research conducted by David Norris
in which he determined that economic variables could be used to classify a country's
naval strength. 113 In that study, Norris first classified countries according to naval
strength based on technological complexity, size, and quantity of fleet assets. Countries
were first classified as being landlocked, or possessing an insignificant navy, a small navy,
or a large navy. Countries with large navies were further divided into four tiers based on
113 David Norris, "Predicting Naval Strength of Latin American Countries from Economic Variables,'
Defense Analysis A no. 2 (1988): 147-152.
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Norris' "professional judgment as a nuclear submarine officer." 114 First tier navies were
those possessing aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and ballistic missile
submarines. Second tier navies were those possessing aircraft carriers and China because
although they did not possess aircraft carriers, they did have nuclear-powered
submarines. Third tier navies were those possessing conventionally-powered submarines
and frigates, and so on.
Applying this classification scheme to Latin America and then using discriminant
analysis, Norris showed that economic variables could correctly predict a country's
classification about 65 percent of the time. The six economic variables best able to
discriminate between the groups were arms exports, arms imports, arms exports/total
exports, GNP per capita, GNP, and military expenditures/GNP. 115
Discriminant analysis generates a discriminant function based on linear
combinations of predictor variables (in Norris' case economic variables) that provide the
best discrimination between the groups (naval strength). The functions are generated from
a sample of cases for which group membership (naval strength) is known, and can then be
applied to new cases with measurements for the predictor variables but unknown group
membership. 1
114
Norris, "Predicting Naval Strength of Latin American Countries," 148.
115
Ibid., 149-150.
116 SPSS Base 7.5for Windows User Guide (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1997), 245.
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The present study is similar to that of Norris' except country classification is
based on the possession of conventionally-powered submarines and not professional
judgment. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990, were used to
determine which countries had conventionally-powered submarines in commission. If a
country was not listed as having a navy in the 1997 edition ofJane 's it was assumed to
be landlocked and withdrawn from the analysis. To further focus on emerging nations, all
NATO countries, USSR, China, Japan, and Australia were excluded from the analysis.
Using discriminant analysis, the possession of conventionally-powered submarines was
predicted with U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) economic variables
in a SPSS database. 117 The following economic variables were used in the analysis:
Armed forces per 1000 population
GNP gross national product (current $)
ME/GNP Military expenditures share of GNP (%)
ME/CGE Defense budgetary share (%)
Arms imports share of total imports (%)
The analysis was repeated on the data sets for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 to
determine the validity of this model for determining when a country might be able to
afford conventionally-powered submarines. Analysis of 1995 was not possible because
ACDA economics data for 1995 is not yet available.
117 Data obtained from U.S. Anns Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) various editions.
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The five economic variables correctly classified the countries an average of 80
percent of the time. The same 105 cases were processed during each analysis. Cases
were excluded if they were missing data from any discriminating variables. Tables 3
through 7 give the results of each analysis.









Yes 14 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%)
No 73 13 (17.8%) 60 (82.2%)









Yes 16 12 (75.0%) 4 (25.0%)
No 70 11 (15.7%) 59 (84.3%)









Yes 17 10 (58.8%) 7 (41.2%)
No 70 9 (12.9%) 61 (87.1%)
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Yes 19 11 (57.9%) 8 (42.1%)
No 58 9 (15.5%) 49 (84.5)









Yes 16 10 (62.5%) 6 (35.3%)
No 45 7 (15.6%) 38 (86.4%)
During the 20 year period covered by this analysis, 15 countries acquired
submarines. Of those 15 countries, 13 were classified correctly. Some definite patterns
emerge in the misclassified countries. Iran was predicted as having submarines each time,
although it has only recently acquired submarines. Czechoslovakia and Mexico were also
consistently misclassified as having submarines. Both Saudi Arabia and UAE were
misclassified 4 out of 5 times as having submarines. Thailand and Singapore were
misclassified as having submarines for 1985 and 1990. Chile was consistently
misclassified as not having submarines, and Colombia was misclassified as not having
submarines 4 out of 5 times.
Of the economic variables used in this analysis, only GNP was consistently
statistically significant according to partial f-test. Running the analysis using GNP as the
only discriminating variable gave a similar overall result of about 80 percent classified
correctly; however, this was weighted towards the non-submarine countries. More
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countries were correctly classified as not having submarines and fewer countries were
correctly classified as having submarines. Although the variation in GNP within each
group (submarines yes/no) was quite large, the mean was consistently about 4 times larger
for those countries possessing submarines than those that did not.
D. CONCLUSION
Although this study is intended as a framework for future analysis, the results
suggest that it may be possible to develop a model using economic variables to predict
when countries are able to afford submarines. With some refinement, this economic
model may prove useful. One refinement could be accomplished by conducting a yearly
analysis based on when countries actually pay for their submarines as opposed to five
year increments based on submarines in commission. It may also prove useful to
differentiate between surplus submarine acquisitions and new construction acquisitions.
Accounting for other non-economic variables (such as prestige, political influence,
security concerns, etc.) and supply-side factors may help explain the consistent
misclassification of certain countries. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to
pursue these issues, this study provides a basic framework in which to continue research
in this area.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, the strong supply-side
factors affecting transfers of expensive advanced conventional weapons, such as submarines, have
converged making it a "buyers' market." Whether the supplier states are motivated to maintain
their technological base, produce arms for economy of scale, or raise hard currency from foreign
sources, they are actively seeking markets for their conventionally-powered submarines.
Suppliers are making attractive deals including the most advanced technology, training, support,
and weapons to attract foreign buyers. Conditions are such that it appears likely to remain a
"buyers' market" with respect to conventionally-powered submarines for at least the next few
decades.
Secondly, the United States presents a security threat to some countries. Balancing U.S.
cruise missile diplomacy has emerged as a motivating factor for countries to acquire
conventionally-powered submarines since the end of the Cold War. Although not one of India's
primary security concerns, evidence presented here suggests that balancing the U.S. naval
presence in the region may have played a small role in their recent decision to purchase additional
conventionally-powered submarines. In the case of Iran, although prestige, political influences,
technological transfer, and bureaucratic motives may all have played some role in Iran's decision
to acquire submarines, the primary motives were security concerns focused on the United States.
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Third, the rapidly growing economies of emerging nations will allow more countries to
afford conventionally-powered submarines in the near future. Singapore, and Thailand, which
were predicted to possess conventionally-powered submarines by the preliminary economics
model presented in this study, have been negotiating deals for submarines. 118
B. IMPLICATIONS
The above conclusions have definite implications for future U.S. foreign policy in general
and for U.S. naval strategy in particular. The supply-side factors making it a "buyers' market"
coupled with increasing numbers of countries motivated to acquire and able to afford
conventionally-powered submarines, suggest that conventionally-powered submarines will
continue to proliferate, not only in numbers, but also the number of countries operating them.
The proliferation of conventionally-powered submarines could significantly impact U.S.
foreign policy by presenting higher risks and increasing the potential costs of conducting cruise
missile diplomacy against a determined adversary. The conventionally-powered submarine
presents a difficult ASW target. According to the U.S. NavyASWAssessment, J996, the
submarine problem in regional conflicts is not simply a subset of the global problem which the
former Soviet Union presented. 119 Additionally, there is considerable uncertainty in the state of
current and future U.S. ASW advantage:
118
"Conventional Submarine Proliferation," Jane 's Defense Weekly 27 no. 7 (February 19, 1997), 22.
119
Department of the Navy, ASWAssessment, 1996 (U), 1 (SECRET document).
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First, the world has changed dramatically in the past five years. While the threat
of global war is certainly diminished, the threat of regional conflict is on the rise.
Second, the dissemination of technology as a necessary part of world commerce is
occurring at a rapid pace. The technology embedded in commercial products no
longer lags the technology in military systems. 120
Also according to the ASWAssessment, "The most difficult problem is now and always
been the initial detection and classification." 121 The proliferation of modern conventionally-
powered submarines makes this even more difficult. Current detection methods include: undersea
and towed listening arrays, airborne detection, shipborne detection, and submarine detection.
Each of these has its limitations. Undersea and towed listening arrays were designed to detect
high speed transiting nuclear submarines and are not always available in littoral regions. Airborne
detection is based primarily on visual or radar detection of submarine masts while the submarine
is at periscope depth or snorkeling to recharge its batteries. The latest generation conventionally-
powered submarines, equipped with air independent propulsion, spend even less time near the
surface than the Argentinean Type-209 did during the Falklands War.
Both surface ships and submarines depend on acoustic detection. Although there is
potential for improvement in every aspect ofASW, poor acoustic detection remains the U.S.
"most critical shortfall." 122 For U.S. surface ships,
• Active sonars have historically been optimized for long-range detection of high
doppler (high speed) targets in deep water. Modern diesel submarines have
very low target strengths (primarily due to their smaller size) and present
insufficient doppler for reliable detection.






Submarines take maximum advantage of the thermal layer and downward
refraction and benefit from the surface ship's inability to conduct continuous,
360 degree active search. Baffle areas provide one impediment and higher
power search is generally limited to specific, rotating search areas.
Variable depth active sonar was abandoned due to limited availability,
reliability problems, and poor training readiness caused by exercise
restrictions.
Active dipping helos, which have been very effective, [are] constrained
primarily to CV defense.
Towed array performance is constrained by the radiated noise ofown ship and
flow noise associated with the tactical; speeds of the multi-mission combatant.
At the same time submarines have been getting steadily quieter.
Passive processing suites have been focused on narrow band observables
which diesel submarine technology has reduced. 123
For U.S. submarines,
• The ability of the submarine force to make initial detection of the latest
Russian nuclear submarines or modern diesel submarines, at tactically
significant ranges, is the major submarine ASW deficiency existing in the fleet
today. Even with the programmed acquisition, detection advantage against
front line nuclear or diesel submarines is lacking. (Emphasis added) 124
Complicating the issue further, not only do conventionally-powered submarines present a
difficult ASW problem, preemptively eliminating such a hazard is an act ofwar and could
certainly not be justified in the pursuit of diplomacy with cruise missiles.





Three recommendations emerge from this study. First, U.S. policy makers must
seriously consider the higher risks and increased costs involved engaging in cruise missile
diplomacy with a country that possess conventionally-powered submarines.
Secondly, the United States should pursue policies that minimize other nation's
perception of U.S. ability and willingness to use cruise missiles in the pursuit of diplomacy. The
development of the arsenal ship is directly contrary to this goal. Any platform developed solely
for the purposes of "inflicting overwhelming, punishing damage" can be nothing but provocative.
The U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race resulting from the U.S. pursuit of the nuclear weapons
provides an illustrative example of the consequences of developing such weapons.
And finally, although according to naval expert Norman Freidman, conventionally-
powered submarines are counterable,
None of this is to say that foreign diesel submarines operating in the littoral
waters would necessarily be pushovers. They would be close to their bases, so
endurance would not be so important for them. They would lack speed, but
weapons could make up for that. Moreover, such submarines lying on the bottom
in ambush might be extremely difficult targets. 125
The U.S. Navy should take the threat posed by conventionally-powered submarines operated by
emerging nations seriously and continue to shift its ASW focus from the open ocean anti-nuclear
submarine problem, to the much more likely problem presented by conventionally-powered
submarines operating in the littorals.





The current worldwide inventories of conventionally-powered submarines

















3 Agosta class ( 1 977-78)
1 Daphne class ( 1 966-70)
12 Type 206 A (1974-75)
5 Type 206 (1973-74)
2 Type 205 (1968-69)
8 Type 209-1 100/1200 (1971-80)
4 Improved Sauro class (1988-95)
4 Sauro class (1979-82)
4 Walrus class ( 1 990-94)
6 Type 210 (1989-92)
6 Type 207 (1964-66)
3 Daphne class ( 1 967-69)
4 Agosta class ( 1 983-83)
4 Daphne class ( 1 973-75)
4 Type 209- 1400 ( 1 994-99)
6 Type 209-1200 (1976-90)
7 Guppy class (1940s)
2 Tang class (1950s)
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Non-NATO Europe, including Russia (total 77)
Albania 1 Whiskey V class ( 1960-6 1
)
Bulgaria 2 Romeo class (1958-61)
Croatia 1 midget submarine
Poland 1 Type 877E Kilo class (1986)
2 Type 64 1 Foxtrot class ( 1 966)
Romania 1 Type 877E Kilo class (1986)
Russia 24 Kilo class (1979-95)
1
6
Type 64 1B Tango class ( 1 973-82)




2 Sava class (1978-81)
2 /Zero/ class (1968-70)
9 midget submarines
3 A 1 9 Gotland class ( 1 996-97)
4 A 1 7 Vastergotland class ( 1 987-90)
3 A 14 jfocfew class (1980-81)
Middle East/Gulf (total 35)
Algeria
Egypt
2 Type 877E Kilo (1987-88)
2 Type 209 (planned)
4 Romeo (1966-84)












Asia Pacific (total 228)
Australia 6 Collins class (1995-99)
2 Oberon class (1969-78)
China 4 Type 877EKM Kilo (1995-)
3 Type 039 Song{\ 994-)
1
3
Type 03 5 M«g ( 1 97 1 -92)
3 8 Romeo class ( 1 962-84)
India 4 Type 209-1500 (1986-94)
8 Type 877EM Kilo ( 1 986-9 1
)
6 Type 641 Foxtrot (1970-75)
Indonesia Type 209-1300 (1981)
Japan 7 Harushio class ( 1 990-97)
1 Yuushio class ( 1 980-89)
1 Uzushio class ( 1 976-78)
North Korea 22 Romeo class (1974-95)
20 Sang-0 (1990's)
50 midget submarines




Pakistan 2 Agosta class (1979-80)
4 Daphne class ( 1 969-70)
2 midget submarines
Singapore 1 Sjoormen (leased) (1960s)
South Africa 3 Daphne class ( 1 970-7 1
)
Taiwan 2 Hai Lung class ( 1 987-88)
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Latin America (total 34)
Argentina 2 Type TR 1700 (1984-85)
2 Type 209-1200 (1974)
Brazil 4 Type 209- 1 400 ( 1 989-99)
3 Oberon class (1973-77)
Chile 2 Type 209-1300 (1984)
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